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Greek pension reform and the ‘change from within’ 
 
‘The problem of pensions in Greece is not a technical problem. For the system to become, as before, a basis for solutions 
and not a source of problems, we must restore the trust of Greek citizens in the system and its prospects. What is required 
is that the pension system should acquire a new authority and credibility’ 
 
Introduction of the Greek Report on Pension Strategy (2002) to the European Commission2
 
The Greek welfare state is described as a ‘laggard’ in terms of formal social protection within 
the European Union –as opposed to the informal support of the family. Its governance system has 
historically served to protect the interests of specific social groups, with the result of an extremely 
fragmented –and unequal- system of social protection. The institutional resistance to change across all 
sectors of welfare provision has consequently accumulated with the passage of time, rendering the 
Greek system very path-dependent. Pension reform has been one of the most pressing issues on the 
Greek political agenda in the past two decades, yet the last two decades have seen radical pension 
reform aborted by the government of the day a number of times. Although the financial cost per se of 
shifting from a predominantly Pay-As-You-Go to a system of pension provision with more private 
elements cannot be underestimated, part of the explanation for the pattern of past parametric Greek 
pension reforms lies with the Greek institutional context. More specifically, a number of internal 
characteristics of the Greek context have traditionally rendered pension reform even more difficult. 
This is on top of the challenges that Greece faces in terms of ageing populations and changing 
employment structures that contribute to the pensions problem, and which are observed on a global 
scale. A series of reforms in the last two decades illustrate the difficulty of bringing the Greek model of 
pension provision in line with the policy goals of the ‘European social model’. In terms of pension 
reform, the effect of the European Union has been minimal. However, a smaller ‘cognitive change’ 
referring to various policy tools has allegedly taken place, and filtered through with incremental reforms 
in policy areas such as vocational training, employment and to a lesser extent, social assistance. Such 
reforms represent a positive development for the relevant sectors, but do they include any lessons for 
                                                 
1 Department of Social Policy, London School of Economics, UK. Email: a.vlachantoni@lse.ac.uk . My thanks are due to 
Jane Lewis for her comments on an earlier draft.  
2 [Greek] Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 2002 
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the issue of pension reform? And do the European guidelines on pension provision represent an 
opportunity for radical pension reform in Greece, given the peculiar rigidity of the Greek welfare state? 
 
This paper is structured as follows. First I look at the characteristics that distinguish the Greek 
welfare state, and I look at how these have structured the pension system through time. In the second 
section, I look at the common challenges that most European welfare states have been presented with 
at the peak of the debate on pension reform and the expansion of the discourse of ‘multi-pillar 
provision’. I argue that the inherent paradoxes of the Greek pension system and socio-political context 
more generally have perpetuated the ‘institutional sclerosis’ of the system, which in turn has constrained 
the drive for reform. In order to illustrate this sclerosis, the third section briefly describes three 
attempts for pension reform from 1990 until today. By the third attempt [in 2002], the European 
guidelines on pension provision had already been outlined via the Open Method of Coordination, 
largely informed by, and balanced with, the ‘multi-pillar model’ discourse that has dominated the debate 
since the early 1990s. These European guidelines, as well as the Greek National Strategy on how to 
achieve them, are discussed in the fourth section. In the final section, I review the evidence for a 
positive European effect on policy areas other than pension reform, and I argue that a much more 
radical approach to reform “from within” is essential to streamline the Greek pension system with what 
the ‘European model’ stands for.  
 
The Greek welfare state 
 
The welfare regime literature has located the Greek welfare state in the ‘Southern 
European/Latin/Mediterranean’ rim (Leibfried, 1993: 139; Ferrera, 1996), although according to some 
accounts Greece joins the ‘corporatist-conservative’ welfare regime (Esping-Andersen, 1990), only with 
a much smaller spending capacity (Katrougalos, 1996). The governance of the Greek welfare state 
reflects a legacy of heavy politicisation and centralisation, coupled with an impoverished administrative 
infrastructure and a set of poorly developed social services (Venieris, 2003: 133; Featherstone, 
Kazamias and Papadimitriou, 2001: 462). The fragmentation of the labour market into protected and 
unprotected sectors is reflected in the fragmentation of social protection, and in turn creates vast 
inequalities between different occupational groups (Venieris, 1997: 268; Petmesidou, 2001; O’Donnell 
and Tinios, 2003: 264-8; Sotiropoulos, 2004: 269). Civil servants, workers in finance and insurance 
industries, and workers in nationalized industries belong to the ‘insiders’ of the welfare system, and 
enjoy a privileged position within the social insurance system and especially the pension system. The 
long-term unemployed, those who have never worked, and those in need of a minimum income 
assistance fall through the social safety net. As a result of the fragmentation of the system, the relatively 
high level of social spending in Greece has paradoxically not translated into effective social transfers 
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(Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000: 122). In this context, the inequalities based on occupational status and 
political affiliation are further exacerbated. 
 
Because of this system fragmentation, according to Petmesidou (1996a: 110) the Greek welfare 
state has allowed the reproduction of ‘...a welfare philosophy based on individual, particularistic needs 
rather than on universal well-being...’, which is also reflected in the largely contributory mode of 
financing, rather than tax financing. There, in turn, lies part of the blame for  the under-development of 
social services more generally and a focus on particularistic cash benefits (Guillen and Matsaganis, 2000: 
122). This philosophy has since been allowed to exist largely due to the traditional family values that 
feature in Greek society. In the absence of strong universal values of traditions of social participation 
and an organised system of welfare provision, this ‘rudimentary’ welfare state (Leibfried, 1993: 139), or 
“state” (Venieris, 2003: 134) has relied on family and kin for informal protection. The Greek family has 
traditionally been a ‘social shock absorber’, especially in areas like childcare, unemployment assistance, 
care for the elderly, housing and social assistance (Matsaganis et al, 2003: 642). The immediate cost of 
this high degree of ‘familialism’ (Petmesidou, 1996b: 329) is the continuous strength of the ‘male 
breadwinner model’ in this country, and consequently, one of the lowest female labour market 
participation rates in the European Union, well below the target set in Lisbon. In 2001, 48.8% of all 
Greek women were in paid work, compared to the European average of 60.1% (OECD Employment 
Outlook, 2002), and this relative gap was consistent across all age groups3. 
 
The origins of this unique ‘welfare culture’ are to be found in the historical development of the 
Greek welfare state. The birth of the Greek welfare state took place at an unconventional point in time 
for European welfare state development, in 1974, when the rule of a seven-year dictatorship was 
terminated. At the time when most other European welfare states were undergoing a period of 
expansion, both in terms of the amount and the scope of welfare provision, Greece was still under-
developed in welfare terms. From the period of under-development, therefore, Greece went straight 
into a period of crisis in the 1980s (Rombolis and Hletsos, 1999: 402). Despite the fast increase in social 
expenditure during the 1980s and especially the second half of this decade4, the balance of the social 
budget did not come about (Stathopoulos, 1996: 144-7; Petmesidou, 2000: 303), and the Greek welfare 
system did not develop in an organisationally cohesive manner with a long-term orientation. At the 
same time, access to political power –in return for electoral support-, rather than need, dictated the 
                                                 
3 In Greece, 33.9% of 15-24-year-olds were in paid work in 2001 [EU average: 43%], 61.3% of 25-54-year-olds [EU average: 
71.6%] and 23.7% of 55-64-year-olds [ EU average: 31.9%] (OECD Employment Outlook, 2002). 
4 The average share of the GDP for public expenditure on social protection was 12.7% under the dictatorship regime in the 
early 1970s, rising to 13.5% [under the Conservative government] in the late 1970s and early 1980s, to 19.8% [under the 
Centre-Socialist government] in the late 1980s, and dropping slightly to 18.8% [under the Conservative government] in the 
early 1990s, and remaining around 19.8% in the late 1990s and into the 21st century [under the Centre-Socialist government] 
(Sotiropoulos, 2004: 268, Table 1). 
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distribution of social provision (Petmesidou, 1991: 32-5), and this laid the foundations for the future 
governance of the Greek welfare state. 
 
With respect to pension provision in particular, one could argue that the problem of the Greek 
system refers to structural problems of the welfare state, which in turn permit the abuses of the system 
in all sectors of welfare provision. On one hand, the fragmentation of welfare provision in Greece is 
clearly reflected in the pension system, which creates inequalities between different social groups 
(Featherstone, 2003: 3). Along with these divisions between more/less privileged groups come 
disincentives/incentives to maintain/change the status quo and prevent/promote radical reform. The 
numerous attempts for radical reform in the past –some of which will be mentioned later in this paper- 
prove this point. On the other hand, the pension provision as it is, offers opportunities for the abuse of 
the system. Two examples convey this point. The first example is the range of contributory conditions, 
some of which are very mild, and some which are regulated by equally lax rules. Contribution evasion is 
a huge problem in Greece, especially in insurance funds where contribution rules are less stringent. For 
instance, an individual may be insured in a lower-income tier than the one they are supposed to be in, 
or an individual may not be insured at all, or it may even be that an employer is receiving contributions 
from an employee but not paying them into an insurance fund. The problem of a lack of 
correspondence between revenue and expenditure is therefore exacerbated on a large scale. The second 
example is the abuse of invalidity pensions (Petmesidou, 2000: 307) –which account for approximately 
one-quarter of all pensions- due to lax eligibility rules (National Statistical Service of Greece, 2000). 
 
Pressure for reform: the usual and the unusual suspects 
 
 It is fair to say that the ‘usual suspects’ contributing to the pension problem on a global scale -
changing demographic and employment structures- have exposed the strength of the more ‘unusual 
suspects’ in the Greek context. Global trends of an ageing population and changing employment 
structures result in fewer workers paying for the pensions of more retirees, while changing family 
structures have long-term effects for family support, income adequacy and long-term care in old-age 
(Sakellaropoulos, 1999: 43-51). The pension reform discourse that has dominated policy agendas 
around the world since the pro-active involvement of the World Bank in the early 1990s, has repeatedly 
pointed to the multi-pillar model of pension provision as the panacea for every context (World Bank, 
1994; Holzmann et al, 2003), including the Greek context (IMF, 2002: 14-16). Both these global 
demographic and structural changes, and the multi-pillar rhetoric have had an impact on the Greek 
context of welfare provision. It is true that the fertility rate in Greece is very low -it was 1.7 in 1985 and 
1.3 in 2000, compared with the OECD average of 1.9 and 1.7 respectively (OECD, 2002). It should be 
noted that, despite the low fertility rate, the role of the Greek family as a support network is still very 
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important. In this respect, family changes in Greece assume a very different nature and pace compared 
to Greece’s Northern European neighbours. It is also true that female labour market participation has 
been increasing since the 1980s, but is still at a much lower level than other European –even Southern 
European- countries. However, although these trends have indicated the seriousness of the pensions 
situation, and share common elements with the challenges faced by other countries, it is internal factors 
that have placed a greater demand on the rationalisation of the Greek pension system.  
 
 Three such factors should be noted. The first factor refers to the structure of the social budget 
as a whole, where pensions have consistently taken more than half of the share5 (Provopoulos and 
Tinios, 1993: 326). Because of the fragmentation of the system, or the distinction in the system 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ as Venieris argues (2003: 134), the large part of the budget dedicated 
to pensions actually reinforces inequalities between different social groups. The second structural 
problem of the Greek system calling for reform is the structure of the Greek labour market. Despite 
the decrease in percentage of workers in agriculture, the increasing participation of women in paid work 
and the high level of immigration that contributes to the labour force, the Greek labour market has 
maintained a rigid structure. Part-time work, which has been dubbed a ‘miracle’ in other European 
models is still very low [5% of total employment], while unemployment was at 9% in 2003. At the same 
time, overall employment is low (just over 55% in 2003), while self-employment is very high (32% of 
total employment, compared with the EU average of 15%). Finally, the phenomenon of an informal 
economy is a considerable element of the Greek labour market (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 275). These 
characteristics place Greece in a peculiar position vis-à-vis the goals set by the European Union in 
terms of employment and labour markets more generally. The third internal pressure for reform is 
actually the fact that radical reform has not taken place for more than two decades. In other words, the 
very high resistance of Greece to pension reform has created accumulated costs –in the form of public 
deficits-, which on one hand are impossible to sustain but on the other hand no working generation 
(current or future) is willing to pay. This is especially problematic because of the predominantly Pay-As-
You-Go nature of the system, which essentially renders it a contract between current and future 
[shrinking] generations of workers (see Myles and Pierson, 2000). 
 
The Greek political system, which exhibits a high degree of system path-dependence, is 
responsible for a large part of this resistance of Greece to change in the pension system and welfare 
provision more generally. The Greek system is a rigid two-party political system (Conservatives and 
Centre-Left), in which both parties recognise the need for pension reform, but electoral calculations 
create few opportunities for a consensus. In this system, specific social groups representing distinct 
                                                 
5 National Statistical Service of Greece (2000) ‘Expenditures of the social insurance organisations, by special categories of 
expenditures: 1990-1998’ (www.statistics.gr) 
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social class interests have maintained political ties with the government in power, in order to maintain 
their privileged position in ‘protected’ insurance funds (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 280). Over the course of 
time, this has created long-term commitments, which as Sotiropoulos (2004: 270) argues, have ‘locked-
in’ policy-makers in the issue of pension policy. In this context, the only reform possible is ‘reform by 
instalments’ (Tinios, 2003). Another factor that acts as an obstacle is the negativity associated with 
pension reform, and the incapacity of the state to convey the advantages of reform, and the cost of 
inaction. Tinios (2003: 6) describes this as ‘...the wide gulf of understanding between ‘experts’ or 
‘technocrats’ on the one hand and of public opinion on the other’. As a result of these characteristics, 
the Greek experience of pension reform has been described as ‘parametric’ by European and indeed 
global standards. Three examples of successful parametric reform, or unsuccessful paradigmatic reform 
depending on one’s viewpoint, from the 1990s until today illustrate this point. 
 
Three examples of successful parametric reform (or unsuccessful paradigmatic reform) 6
 
 The Conservative government (‘New Democracy’) elected in 1990 aimed at passing pension 
reform in two stages: the first was to correct a collection of minor fiscal imbalances in the system, such 
as making adjustments to reduce the public deficit, and the second was to proceed with more major 
structural changes, such as the merging of insurance funds. Three laws were passed between 1990 and 
19937, targeting the mounting deficit of specific funds and the public deficit, but the rationalisation of 
the system was postponed. Financial liberalisation and a more general problem in the public finances 
were key characteristics of this period. The increase of pensionable age for civil servants, the rise in 
contributions, the cut of benefits for new entrants in the system, and the tightening of the eligibility 
criteria for invalidity benefits were important changes, but not adequate to reduce the degree of 
fragmentation and inequality in the system (Petmesidou, 2000: 309). After these minor adjustments, the 
largest union of workers (GSEE) emphasised the need for a unified pension system, indexing pensions 
to wages, and tripartite funding of social security (employer-employee-state). The multi-pillar model 
had already surfaced: (i) a universal scheme granting a guaranteed minimum pension and funded by 
general taxation, (ii) a compulsory supplementary pension scheme, funded on the basis of contributions, 
and (iii) a voluntary supplementary pension system based on private insurance (Provopoulos and Tinios, 
1993: 339).This change, however, was too high a political risk for the government to take. 
 
                                                 
6 For the purposes of this paper, I use Holzmann, MacKellar and Rutkowski’s (2003: 8) definition of ‘parametric’ and 
‘paradigmatic’ pension reform. A parametric reform is an attempt to rationalise the pension system by seeking more 
revenues and reducing expenditures while expanding voluntary private pension provisions. A paradigmatic reform is a deep 
change in the fundamentals of pension provision typically caused by the introduction of a mandatory funded pension pillar, 
along with a seriously reformed PAYG pillar and the expansion of opportunities for voluntary retirement saving. 
7 Laws 1902/90, 1976/91 and 2084/92 
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Policy history was repeated a few years later, when a similar attempt in two phases took place 
under the new Centre-Left government (‘Panhellenic Socialist Movement’), which came into office in 
1993. Pressure for convergence with the Maastricht criteria brought the public finances in the spotlight, 
especially the pension system8. The government appointed a specialist committee (‘Spraos Committee’) 
to make recommendations for reform, however when the report of the committee was published in 
October 1997, and amidst public outrage, the government distanced itself from the findings. This 
initiated a process of ‘social dialogue’, which resulted in laws on contribution evasion and the merging 
of certain insurance funds9. The ‘mini-pension reform’, as it was characterised, had been passed, but the 
second wave of more radical reform was once again postponed (Petmesidou, 2000: 312). 
 
 The third and most recent pension reform of 2002 (Law 3029/02) was described as an attempt 
of the Centre-Left government to tackle an issue that it had promised to tackle, but without causing 
confrontation with the parties involved. The retirement age remained at 65 for both men and women 
who entered the system after 1993, the minimum pension was fixed at 70% of the minimum wage, 
while the merging of funds with the largest insurance fund (IKA) was to take place on a ‘voluntary’ 
basis. These were significantly ‘watered-down’ changes compared to the recommendations of the 
British Government Actuaries Department, who had been called in to examine the system and come 
up with recommendations. This legislation would be remembered for the lack of wider consensus in 
producing it, nevertheless it succeeded in taking the pensions off the political agenda temporarily 
(Matsaganis, 2002: 118). It would also be remembered, in contrast to the previous legislative 
introductions, as the Greek ‘contribution’ or ‘response’ to the European Open Method of 
Coordination in pension reform. 
 
The European guidelines on pension provision 
 
The Open Method of Coordination in the field of pension provision is the result of decisions 
taken during the European Councils in Lisbon, Feira, Goteborg, Laeken and Stockholm, with regard to 
the quality and sustainability of pension provision (SPC, 2000; EPC, 2001; CEU, 2001). The Pensions 
OMC has centred around three broad aims (CEC, 2001). The first one is ‘financial viability’, covering 
the sustainability of pensions, sound public finances, specified employment levels, the extension of 
working lives, inter-generational balance in terms of pension provision, and the sound development of 
private pension provision. The second goal is ‘pension adequacy’, referring to the prevention of poverty 
                                                 
8 Petmesidou (2000: 324) actually argues that it was this one-dimensional focus on fiscal discipline stipulated by the 
Maastricht criteria that produced the pressure for pension reform, rather than a wide consensus from social partners, driven 
by a strong culture of civil society in Greece. This reform was a good example of the limits of external empowerment. 
9 Laws 2676/99, 2703/99 and 2688/99 aimed at merging some of the funds, while Laws 2559/97, 2519/97 and 2639/98 
targeted the huge problem of contribution evasion. 
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in old age, again inter-generational solidarity and the maintenance of living standards in old-age. Finally, 
pension ‘modernisation’ aims at the adjustment of European pension systems to changing employment 
patterns, promoting gender equality and system transparency, as well as promoting consensus in the 
debate on pension reform.  
 
In the field of pension reform the jury is still out on the strength of the OMC, but the evidence 
to date appears to portray this method as little more than a promise. Natali and de la Porte’s (2004a, 
2004b) analysis of the effect of the Pensions OMC in the French and Dutch pension systems, for 
instance, highlights the importance of national contexts on a normative, cognitive as well as procedural 
level. They conclude that ‘…the pensions OMC could…only support Member States in their reform 
efforts if the [National Strategy] reports…change from report on past activities to forward-looking 
policy documents’ (2004b: 17). This point was certainly evident in the Greek report on the national 
strategy for the attainment of the goals set by the Pensions OMC 10. The legislation introduced in 2002 
–the third reform attempt described above- was presented as a multiple contribution to all three OMC 
aims of financial viability, pension adequacy and pensions modernization. Yet by most accounts, this 
legislation was an addition to the list of small, incremental reforms -or aborted radical reform in the 
name of electoral survival. Even more interestingly, the report referred explicitly to a ‘window of 
opportunity’ until 2015, by which time a ‘coherent strategy’ on pensions would be put in place. This 
alone was a declaration of postponement. The European Council and the Economic Policy Committee 
had long known the size of the Greek pension problem (EC/ECP, 2002), yet the process of monetary 
integration (EMU) that had started in the 1990s proved a missed opportunity for the Greek reform –in 
contrast to the Italian case (Reynand and Hege, 1996). The European Council, in response, recognised 
the 2002 reform as ‘laying the groundwork for further reform efforts’, but also warned that ‘there is 
substantial scope for improvement…by gradually developing second-pillar schemes, …stabilizing 
expenditure growth, … curbing contribution evasion, …and raising employment rates as required by 
the Lisbon and Stockholm quantitative targets’ (CEU, 2003: 128).  
 
Although the more recent pension reform did not have the scope and nature of the kind 
required in the Greek case, a number of ‘European’ policy tools have, according to some accounts, 
infiltrated the formulation and monitoring of social policy in Greece. These include neo-corporatist 
structures of consultation among social partners, expert committees, the establishment of new 
institutions [and their importance at least on a cognitive level], and the adoption of National Action 
Plans (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 273-5). All of these tools have emerged in Greek social policy, however the 
European theory on pension provision has not really fed into practice on the Greek level. In other 
social policy areas the piecemeal approach to reform, largely due to the European pressures, has 
                                                 
10 [Greek] Ministry of Economy and Finance, Ministry of Labour and Social Security (2002)  
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produced better results. Within the labour market, for instance, specific measures were adopted 
through the 2003 National Action Plan for Employment in order to encourage more part-time work, to 
promote gender equality in the labour market and to expand child-support infrastructure. As far as 
social assistance is concerned, two new social-assistance benefits were introduced by the Centre-Left 
government in 2000-1, but have been less successful due to low take-up rates (Matsaganis et al, 2003: 
644). The first was a social security rebate for minimum-wage earners, and the second was an 
unemployment benefit for older, long-term unemployed on low incomes. In both these areas, the 
Greek response to European warnings has been more genuine compared to pension reform. 
 
 The fact that the impact of the European Union has been ‘felt’ more in areas such as 
employment and social assistance, compared to the area of pension reform is not surprising given the 
peculiarities of the Greek context. The parametric nature of pension reforms since the birth of the 
Greek welfare state reflects the fragmentary structure of the pension system itself and of the Greek 
welfare state more generally. At the same time, old-age and invalidity pensions as already mentioned, 
represent the largest part of the social expenditure in Greece, and that has not changed significantly in 
the last twenty-five years (Sotiropoulos, 2004: 270, Table 3). This means that it is in the interests of the 
social groups, who benefit the most from the status quo –such as the public sector employees-, to 
prevent a paradigmatic change of the pension system. For the less influential groups –such as private 
sector employees and part-time workers-, who incidentally benefit less from the status quo, the issue of 
pension reform is desirable and even more crucial. Therefore, as long as industrial relations remain so 
heavily politicised in Greece, the ‘insiders’ will have an influence the policy choices of the government 
in office, while the ‘outsiders’ will not. In this context, it is important to understand what Featherstone 
et al (2001) have termed ‘the limits of external empowerment’. In this context, the European Union has 
a very positive role to play in the debate on Greek pension reform, as it can add consistency between 
theory and practice, as well as expand good practice across Member states (Sissouras and Amitsis, 1994: 
258; Tinios, 2003: 13). Yet the solution of the structural problems of the Greek welfare state is an 
essential prerequisite for radical change.  
 
 An appropriate conclusion is to recognise that it is a combination of external and 
internal pressures that call for the reform of the Greek pension system. The balance, however, between 
the two is unequal. The rules that govern the Greek welfare state have not changed significantly since 
Greece’s accession in the European Community in 1981, and this is unfortunately reflected in the 
inherent fragmentation and inequality that still burdens its pension system. It is this context, coupled 
with the rigid bipolar political culture that has consistently constrained pension reform in the past. The 
European Union can offer a helping hand in the form of guiding principles, as it has through the OMC, 
but unless the ‘policy ground’ is ‘fertile’, as was the case with smaller changes in employment and social 
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assistance, the role of the OMC is limited. Greek integration in the European Union represents a 
challenge, it represents a ‘new form of governance’ (Tsoukalis, 2000: 37), under which membership is 
not selective vis-à-vis benefits and responsibilities. Reflecting on the institutional rigidity of the Greek 
welfare state, one could argue that, in line with the Greek tradition of two-stage reforms, ‘paradigmatic’ 
reform in Greece would mean something rather different to what ‘paradigmatic’ reform means in the 
rest of Europe. Firstly, it would mean the rationalisation of the existing pension system, and secondly, 
the gradual introduction of funded elements in pension provision, as the multi-pillar model dictates. 
But in order for this to happen, as the Greek Report admits in its very first sentence, the trust of the 
citizens in the pension system must be restored, so that it acquires new authority and credibility. The 
evidence so far on Greek public attitudes to pension reform suggests a dissatisfaction with and lack of 
confidence in the Greek pension system. The Greek public recognises the need for reform, yet remains 
optimistic for the future and does not view the problem as having an effect on a personal, individual 
level. O’ Donnell and Tinios (2003: 276) argue that this inconsistency may result from the design of the 
system itself, in which case public attitudes ‘...not only represent a constraint for reform, they are 
endogenous to the system itself and a vicious circle is created in which a flawed system generates public 
opinion that supports the system and blocks reform’. In this case, what is required for the radical 
reform of the Greek pension system is a new social contract between the civil society and the state on 
one hand, and the political processes and the economy on the other (Petmesidou, 2000: 324). 
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